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Zivotofsky v. Kerry
13-628
Ruling Below: Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 725 F.3d 197 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert granted 134
S.Ct. 1873 (2014).
Three-year-old child, through his United States citizen parents, brought action for declaratory
and injunctive relief against Secretary of State, alleging that child, who was born in Jerusalem,
was entitled pursuant to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act to have “Jerusalem, Israel”
listed as his place of birth on his U.S. passport. The United States District Court for the District
of Columbia granted Secretary's motion to dismiss. Child appealed. The Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded for further development of the record, in light of child's amendment of
the claim for injunctive relief, to seek “Israel” as designated place of birth. On remand, Secretary
renewed the motion to dismiss or for summary judgment and child cross-moved for summary
judgment. The District Court granted motion to dismiss. Child appealed. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, and denied rehearing en banc. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court vacated and
remanded.
Question Presented: Whether a federal statute that directs the Secretary of State, on request, to
record the birthplace of an American citizen born in Jerusalem as born in "Israel" on a Consular
Report of Birth Abroad and on a United States passport is unconstitutional on the ground that the
statute "impermissibly infringes on the President's exercise of the recognition power reposing
exclusively in him."

Menachem Binyamin ZIVOTOFSKY, by his Parents and Guardians Ari Z. and Naomi
Siegman ZIVOTOFSKY, Appellant
v.
SECRETARY OF STATE, Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit
Decided on July 23, 2013
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
HENDERSON, Circuit Judge
Section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, requires the Secretary
(Secretary) of the United States Department
of State (State Department) to record
"Israel" as the place of birth on the passport
of a United States citizen born in Jerusalem

if the citizen or his guardian so requests. The
Secretary has not enforced the provision,
believing that it impermissibly intrudes on
the President's exclusive authority under the
United States Constitution to decide whether
and on what terms to recognize foreign
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nations. We agree and therefore hold that
section 214(d) is unconstitutional.
I. BACKGROUND
The status of the city of Jerusalem is one of
the most contentious issues in recorded
history. For more than two millennia, the
city has been won and lost by a host of
sovereigns. The controversy continues today
as the state of Israel and the Palestinian
people both claim sovereignty over the city.
It is against this background that the dispute
in this case arises.
Since the middle of the twentieth century,
United States Presidents have taken a
position of strict neutrality on the issue of
which sovereign controls Jerusalem. After
Israel declared its independence in 1948,
President Harry S. Truman promptly
recognized it as a foreign sovereign.
Nevertheless, Presidents from Truman on
have consistently declined to recognize
Israel's — or any country's — sovereignty
over Jerusalem… As the Secretary
summarized in response to interrogatories
proposed in this case:
Within the framework of this highly
sensitive, and potentially volatile,
mix of political, juridical, and
religious
considerations,
U.S.
Presidents
have
consistently
endeavored to maintain a strict
policy of not prejudging the
Jerusalem status issue and thus not
engaging in official actions that
would recognize, or might be
perceived as constituting recognition
of, Jerusalem as either the capital
city of Israel, or as a city located

within the sovereign territory of
Israel.
The State Department's Foreign Affairs
Manual
(FAM)
contains
passport
administration rules that reflect the policy of
neutrality. The FAM first directs in detail
how the applicant's birthplace is to be stated
on his passport. "As a general rule, enter the
country of the applicant's birth in the [place
of birth field on the] passport." If, however,
the applicant was born "in territory disputed
by another country, the city or area of birth
may be written" in lieu of the country.
Similarly, an applicant may request that his
passport list the "city or town, rather than
the country, of [his] birth." Regarding
Jerusalem, the FAM sets forth a detailed
policy:
For applicants born before May 14,
1948 in a place that was within the
municipal borders of Jerusalem,
enter JERUSALEM as their place of
birth. For persons born before May
14, 1948 in a location that was
outside Jerusalem's municipal limits
and later was annexed by the city,
enter either PALESTINE or the
name of the location (area/city) as it
was known prior to annexation. For
persons born after May 14, 1948 in a
location that was outside Jerusalem's
municipal limits and later was
annexed by the city, it is acceptable
to enter the name of the location
(area/city) as it was known prior to
annexation. . . .
The FAM specifically provides that, for an
applicant born in Jerusalem: "Do not write
Israel or Jordan" on his passport and,
further, that Israel "[d]oes not include
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Jerusalem. . . ." In sum, the State
Department must record "Jerusalem" — not
"Jerusalem, Israel" or "Israel" — as the
place of birth on the passport for an
applicant born in Jerusalem after 1948.

enacted the legislation with a waiver
provision authorizing the President to
suspend the funding restriction for sixmonth periods to "protect the national
security interests of the United States."

Recently, the Congress has attempted to
alter the Executive branch's consistent
policy of neutrality. In 1995, it enacted the
Jerusalem Embassy Act, which provides that
"Jerusalem should be recognized as the
capital of the State of Israel"; [and] "the
United States Embassy in Israel should be
established in Jerusalem no later than May
31, 1999"… During the Congress's
consideration of the legislation, the
Executive branch communicated with the
Congress regarding its constitutionality. The
United States Department of Justice (DOJ)
via an assistant attorney general wrote to the
White House Counsel: "It is well settled that
the Constitution vests the President with the
exclusive authority to conduct the Nation's
diplomatic relations with other States," that
"the President's recognition power is
exclusive" and that "[t]he proposed bill
would severely impair the President's
constitutional authority to determine the
form and manner of the Nation's diplomatic
relations." The DOJ official explained that
his conclusions were "not novel"…
Similarly, the then-Secretary expressed
opposition to the legislation in a letter to the
Senate Majority Leader. The Secretary
explained that … "any effort by Congress to
bring [Jerusalem] to the forefront is illadvised and potentially very damaging to the
success of the peace process." He echoed the
DOJ official's doubts regarding the bill's
constitutionality. Ultimately, the Congress

On September 30, 2002, President George
W. Bush signed into law the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act. Section 214(d)
is the provision at issue and it provides:
(d) RECORD OF PLACE OF
BIRTH
AS
ISRAEL
FOR
PASSPORT PURPOSES. — For
purposes of the registration of birth,
certification of nationality, or
issuance of a passport of a United
States citizen born in the city of
Jerusalem, the Secretary shall, upon
the request of the citizen or the
citizen's legal guardian, record the
place of birth as Israel.
When the President signed the Act,
however, he also issued a signing statement,
noting that "the Act contains a number of
provisions that impermissibly interfere with
the constitutional functions of the
presidency in foreign affairs," including
section 214:
Section 214, concerning Jerusalem,
impermissibly interferes with the
President's constitutional authority to
conduct the Nation's foreign affairs
and to supervise the unitary
executive branch. Moreover, the
purported direction in section 214
would, if construed as mandatory
rather than advisory, impermissibly
interfere with the President's
constitutional authority to formulate
the position of the United States,
speak for the Nation in international
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affairs, and determine the terms on
which recognition is given to foreign
states. U.S. policy regarding
Jerusalem has not changed.
Menachem Zivotofsky (Zivotofsky) is a
United States citizen born in 2002 in
Jerusalem to parents who are United States
citizens. In 2002, Zivotofsky's mother
applied for a United States passport for
Zivotofsky, listing his birthplace as
"Jerusalem, Israel." The State Department,
however, following its Jerusalem policy set
forth in 7 FAM 1383.5-6, issued a passport
in Zivotofsky's name listing "Jerusalem" as
his place of birth.
On September 16, 2003, Zivotofsky, "by his
parents and guardians, Ari Z. and Naomi
Siegman Zivotofsky," brought suit against
the Secretary, seeking, inter alia, declaratory
relief and a permanent injunction ordering
the Secretary to issue him a passport listing
"Jerusalem, Israel" as his place of birth. The
litigation has been up and down the
appellate ladder. First, on September 7,
2004, the district court dismissed the case,
concluding that Zivotofsky lacked Article III
standing and, alternatively, that the case
presented a nonjusticiable political question.
We subsequently reversed and remanded,
holding that Zivotofsky had standing… We
"remand[ed] the case to the district court so
that both sides may develop a more
complete record relating to these and other
subjects of dispute."
On September 19, 2007, the district court
again dismissed the case, once more
deciding it presented a nonjusticiable
political question. We affirmed, concluding

that "[b]ecause the judiciary has no authority
to order the Executive Branch to change the
nation's foreign policy in this matter, this
case is nonjusticiable under the political
question doctrine."
The United States Supreme Court vacated
and remanded, holding that the case does not
present a political question. The Court
explained that "[t]he federal courts are not
being asked to supplant a foreign policy
decision of the political branches. . . .
[i]nstead, Zivotofsky requests that the courts
enforce a specific statutory right." Given
that the parties do not dispute the substance
of section 214(d), that is, its requirement
that "Israel" be recorded on the passport as
the applicant's birthplace at his request, "the
only real question for the courts is whether
the statute is constitutional," which requires
"deciding whether the statute impermissibly
intrudes upon Presidential powers under the
Constitution." The Court further explained
that "[r]esolution of Zivotofsky's claim
demands careful examination of the textual,
structural, and historical evidence put
forward by the parties regarding the nature
of the statute and of the passport and
recognition powers."
II. THE MERITS
Before addressing the merits, we address
two preliminary matters. First, …
Zivotofsky maintains that we should not
reach the Secretary's constitutional defense
because
section
214(d)
constitutes
permissible passport legislation. But
Zivotofsky's proposed solution — that we
hold in effect that the President's
constitutional recognition power is not so
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broad as to encompass section 214(d) — is a
constitutional holding. We would not avoid
"pass[ing] upon a constitutional question"
by resolving the case in that manner; instead
we would give the President's constitutional
power the narrow construction Zivotofsky
presses…
Second, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Company v. Sawyer, Justice Jackson set
forth a tripartite framework for evaluating
the President's powers to act depending on
the level of congressional acquiescence.
First, "[w]hen the President acts pursuant to
an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum."
… Second, "[w]hen the President acts in
absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his
own independent powers, but there is a zone
of twilight in which he and Congress may
have concurrent authority." … Third,
"[w]hen the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest
ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional
powers
minus
any
constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter." Both parties agree that this case
falls into category three. In this category the
President may nonetheless exercise — and
the Congress cannot invade — the
President's "exclusive power." The question
here is whether exclusive Executive branch
power authorizes the Secretary to decline to
enforce section 214(d).
A. The Recognition Power
Recognition is the act by which "a state
commits itself to treat an entity as a state or

to treat a regime as the government of a
state." "The rights and attributes of
sovereignty
belong
to
[a
state]
independently of all recognition, but it is
only after it has been recognized that it is
assured of exercising them." Recognition is
therefore a critical step in establishing
diplomatic relations with the United States;
if the United States does not recognize a
state, it means the United States is
"unwilling[] to acknowledge that the
government in question speaks as the
sovereign authority for the territory it
purports to control." …
A government typically recognizes a foreign
state by "written or oral declaration."
Recognition may also be implied…
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has
directed us to examine the "textual,
structural, and historical evidence" the
parties have marshaled regarding "the nature
. . . of the passport and recognition powers."
We first address the recognition power and,
in particular, whether the power is held
exclusively by the President.
B. The President and the Recognition
Power
Text and Originalist Evidence
Neither the text of the Constitution nor
originalist evidence provides much help in
answering the question of the scope of the
President's recognition power. In support of
his view that the recognition power lies
exclusively with the President, the Secretary
cites the "receive ambassadors" clause of
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution,
which provides, inter alia, that the President
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"shall receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers." But the fact that the President is
empowered to receive ambassadors, by
itself, does not resolve whether he has the
exclusive authority to recognize foreign
nations…
Originalist evidence also fails to clarify the
Constitution's text…
The President's
power to
receive
ambassadors may of necessity mean that he
has the power not only to "receive" a foreign
ambassador but also to decide whether and
when to receive him…
There is little [] ratification-era evidence
regarding the recognition of foreign
governments. In fact, "there is no record that
the subject of recognizing foreign states or
governments ever came up in the
[Constitutional] Convention." … In other
words, the Framers apparently were not
concerned with how their young country
recognized other nations because the issue
was not important to them at the time of
ratification.
Post-ratification History
Both parties make extensive arguments
regarding the post-ratification recognition
history of the United States. As the Supreme
Court has explained, longstanding and
consistent post-ratification practice is
evidence of constitutional meaning. We
conclude that longstanding post-ratification
practice supports the Secretary's position
that the President exclusively holds the
recognition power.

Beginning with the administration of our
first President, George Washington, the
Executive has believed that it has the
exclusive power to recognize foreign
nations… In 1817, President James Monroe
prevailed in a standoff with Speaker of the
House Henry Clay over the recognition
power… In 1864 and, again, 1896, the
Executive branch challenged the individual
houses of the Congress for intruding into the
realm of recognition, which eventually led
the Congress to refrain from acting… In
1919, the Congress once again relented in
response to the President's assertion of
exclusive recognition power…
Zivotofsky marshals several isolated events
in support of his position that the
recognition power does not repose solely in
the Executive but they are unconvincing…
Supreme Court Precedent
It is undisputed that "in the foreign affairs
arena, the President has 'a degree of
discretion and freedom from statutory
restriction which would not be admissible
were domestic affairs alone involved.'"
While the President's foreign affairs powers
are not precisely defined, the courts have
long recognized the President's presumptive
dominance in matters abroad. Thus, the
Court, echoing the words of thenCongressman John Marshall, has described
the President as the "sole organ of the nation
in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations."
The Supreme Court has more than once
declared that the recognition power lies
exclusively with the President. To be sure,
59

the Court has not held that the President
exclusively holds the power. But, for us —
an inferior court — "carefully considered
language of the Supreme Court, even if
technically dictum, generally must be treated
as authoritative."
In Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Company,
the issue before the Court was whether "the
Falkland islands . . . constitute any part of
the dominions within the sovereignty of the
government of Buenos Ayres." The Court
decided that the President's action in the
matter was "conclusive on the judicial
department."
...
Similarly, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, without determining whether the
United States had derecognized Cuba's
government under Fidel Castro, the Court
explained that "[p]olitical recognition is
exclusively a function of the Executive." …
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1933
recognition of the Soviet Union led to three
eases supporting the conclusion that the
President exclusively holds the recognition
power…
In Belmont, the Court held that New York
State's conflicting public policy did not
prevent the United States from collecting
assets assigned by the Litvinov Assignment.
It noted that "who is the sovereign of a
territory is not a judicial question, but one
the determination of which by the political
departments conclusively binds the courts."
But the Court then more specifically
explained that "recognition, establishment of

diplomatic relations, the assignment, and
agreements with respect thereto, were all
parts of one transaction" and plainly "within
the competence of the President."…
In Guaranty Trust, the Court held that a
United States claim for payment of funds
held in a bank account formerly owned by
Russia was barred by New York State's
statute of limitations. In so doing, it relied
on the Executive branch's recognition
determination…
Finally, the Supreme Court in Pink,
following Belmont, held that New York
State could not "deny enforcement of a
claim under the Litvinov Assignment
because of an overriding [state] policy." The
Court defined the recognition power broadly
and placed it in the hands of the President…
The Court also treated the recognition power
as belonging exclusively to the Executive in
Baker v. Carr. It explained that "recognition
of [a] foreign government[] so strongly
defies judicial treatment that without
executive recognition a foreign state has
been called a republic of whose existence
we know nothing." …
Zivotofsky relies on United States v.
Palmer, where the Court stated that "the
courts of the union must view [a] newly
constituted government as it is viewed by
the legislative and executive departments of
the government of the United States." But
this observation simply means that the
judiciary will not decide the question of
recognition. When the High Court has
discussed the recognition power with more
specificity, as it did in the above-cited cases,
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it has not merely stated that the judiciary
lacks authority to decide the issue but
instead has explained that the President has
the exclusive authority. In addition,
Zivotofsky's reliance on Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, is misplaced as the case dealt with
the recognition of Indian tribes which, the
Cherokee Nation opinion itself explains, are
materially distinct from foreign nations.
Having reviewed the Constitution's text and
structure, Supreme Court precedent and
longstanding post-ratification history, we
conclude that the President exclusively
holds the power to determine whether to
recognize a foreign sovereign.
C. Section 214(d) and the "Passport
Power" vis-à-vis the Recognition Power
Having concluded that the President
exclusively holds the recognition power, we
turn to the "passport power," pursuant to
which section 214(d) is alleged to have been
enacted. We must decide whether the
Congress validly exercised its passport
power in enacting section 214(d) or whether
section 214(d) "impermissibly intrudes" on
the President's exclusive recognition power.
Zivotofsky first contends that section 214(d)
is a permissible exercise of the Congress's
"passport power." In its remand to us, the
Supreme Court directed that we examine,
inter alia, the parties' evidence regarding
"the nature of . . . the passport . . . power[]."
Neither party has made clear the textual
source of the passport power in the
Constitution, suggesting that it may come
from the Congress's power regarding
immigration and foreign commerce.

Nonetheless, it is clear that the Congress has
exercised its legislative power to address the
subject of passports. It does not, however,
have exclusive control over all passport
matters. Rather, the Executive branch has
long been involved in exercising the
passport power, especially if foreign policy
is implicated… After the first passport law
was enacted in 1856, "[t]he President and
the Secretary of State consistently construed
the 1856 Act to preserve their authority to
withhold passports on national security and
foreign policy grounds." And once the
Congress enacted the Passport Act of 1926,
each successive President interpreted the
Act to give him the authority to control the
issuance of passports for national security or
foreign policy reasons…
Zivotofsky relies on Supreme Court
precedent that, he contends, shows the
Executive cannot regulate passports unless
the Congress has authorized him to do so. In
both cases cited, the Court held that the
Executive branch acted properly once the
Congress had authorized it to so act. But in
neither case did the Court state that the
Congress's power over passports was
exclusive. Indeed, in Haig, the Court made
clear that it did not decide that issue.
Likewise, in Zemel, the Court in effect
rejected the dissenters' statements implying
that the Congress exclusively regulates
passports. Instead, the Court emphasized
that the "Congress — in giving the
Executive authority over matters of foreign
affairs — must of necessity paint with a
brush broader than that it customarily wields
in domestic areas." Thus, while the
Congress has the power to enact passport
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legislation, its passport power is not
exclusive…
The question we must answer, then, is
whether section 214(d) — which speaks
only to passports — nonetheless interferes
with the President's exclusive recognition
power. Zivotofsky contends that section
214(d) causes no such interference because
of its limited reach, that is, it simply
regulates one detail of one limited type of
passport. But the President's recognition
power "is not limited to a determination of
the government to be recognized"; it also
"includes the power to determine the policy
which is to govern the question of
recognition." Applying this rule, the Pink
Court held that New York State policy was
superseded by the Litvinov Assignment
when the policy — which declined to give
effect to claims under the Litvinov
Assignment — "collid[ed] with and
subtract[ed]
from
the
[President's
recognition] policy" by "tend[ing] to restore
some of the precise impediments to friendly
relations which the President intended to
remove" with his recognition policy.
With the recognition power overlay, section
214(d) is not, as Zivotofsky asserts,
legislation that simply — and neutrally —
regulates the form and content of a passport.
Instead, as the Secretary explains, it runs
headlong into a carefully calibrated and
longstanding Executive branch policy of
neutrality toward Jerusalem… The State
Department FAM implements the Executive
branch policy of neutrality by designating
how a Jerusalem-born citizen's passport
notes his place of birth. For an applicant like

Zivotofsky, who was born in Jerusalem after
1948, the FAM is emphatic: denote the place
of birth as "Jerusalem." In his interrogatory
responses, the Secretary explained the
significance of the FAM's Jerusalem
directive: "Any unilateral action by the
United
States
that
would
signal,
symbolically or concretely, that it recognizes
that Jerusalem is a city that is located within
the sovereign territory of Israel would
critically compromise the ability of the
United States to work with Israelis,
Palestinians and others in the region to
further the peace process." Thus, "[w]ithin
the framework of this highly sensitive, and
potentially volatile, mix of political,
juridical, and religious considerations, U.S.
Presidents have consistently endeavored to
maintain a strict policy of not prejudging the
Jerusalem status issue and thus not engaging
in official actions that would recognize, or
might be perceived as constituting
recognition of, Jerusalem as either the
capital city of Israel, or as a city located
within the sovereign territory of Israel." …
We find the Secretary's detailed explanation
of the conflict between section 214(d) and
Executive recognition policy compelling,
especially given "our customary policy to
accord deference to the President in matters
of foreign affairs." By attempting to alter the
State Department's treatment of passport
applicants born in Jerusalem, section 214(d)
directly contradicts a carefully considered
exercise of the Executive branch's
recognition power.
Our reading of section 214(d) as an
attempted legislative articulation of foreign
policy is consistent with the Congress'
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characterization of the legislation. By its
own terms, section 214 was enacted to alter
United States foreign policy toward
Jerusalem. The title of section 214 is
"United States Policy with Respect to
Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel." Section
214(a) explains that "[t]he Congress
maintains its commitment to relocating the
United States Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem
and urges the President . . . to immediately
begin the process of relocating the United
States Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem." …
Various members of the Congress explained
that the purpose of section 214(d) was to
affect United States policy toward Jerusalem
and Israel.
Moreover, as the Secretary averred earlier in
this litigation, the 2002 enactment of section
214 "provoked strong reaction throughout
the Middle East, even though the President
in his signing statement said that the
provision would not be construed as
mandatory and assured that “U.S. policy
regarding Jerusalem has not changed.” For
example, various Palestinian groups issued
statements asserting that section 214
"undermine[d] the role of the U.S. as a
sponsor
of
the
peace
process,"
"undervalu[ed] . . . Palestinian, Arab and
Islamic rights in Jerusalem" and "rais[ed]
questions about the real position of the U.S.
Administration vis-à-vis Jerusalem." As in
Pink, the Secretary's enforcement of section
214(d) "would collide with and subtract
from the [President's] policy" by "help[ing]
keep alive one source of friction" between
the United States and parties in conflict in
the Middle East "which the policy of
recognition was designed to eliminate."

Zivotofsky argues that the Secretary has not
suffered — and will not suffer — adverse
foreign policy consequences by issuing him
a passport that lists his place of birth as
Israel. He asserts that the Secretary has
admitted that, from time to time, the State
Department has inadvertently issued
passports with "Israel" as the place of birth
to citizens born in Jerusalem and that there
is no evidence that the issuance of the
passports resulted in harm to the United
States's foreign policy interests… Likewise,
Amicus Zionist Organization of America
exhaustively catalogues official United
States websites that contained "Jerusalem,
Israel" before recent revisions… Zivotofsky
also contends that the Secretary's fear of
harm is exaggerated because section
214(d)'s passport directive is not unlike its
Taiwan directive that allows an applicant
born in Taiwan to specify as his birthplace
"Taiwan" rather than "China," which
directive has been peacefully implemented.
Nonetheless, we are not equipped to secondguess the Executive regarding the foreign
policy consequences of section 214(d). As
the Executive — the "sole organ of the
nation in its external relations" — is the one
branch of the federal government before us
and both the current Executive branch as
well as its predecessor believe that section
214(d) would cause adverse foreign policy
consequences (and in fact presented
evidence that it had caused foreign policy
consequences), that view is conclusive on
us. Moreover, Zivotofsky's reliance on the
State Department's earlier, incidental
references to "Jerusalem, Israel" or inclusion
of "Israel" on the passports of United States
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citizens born in Jerusalem is entirely
misplaced. The controversy does not arise
because a website or passport at one time
included a reference connecting Jerusalem
and Israel. Rather, the unconstitutional
intrusion results from section 214(d)'s
attempted alteration of United States policy
to require the State Department to take an
official and intentional action to include
"Israel" on the passport of a United States
citizen born in Jerusalem…
D. Zivotofsky's Remaining Arguments
Zivotofsky challenges the Secretary's
decision declining to enforce section 214(d)
on two additional grounds but we find both
grounds without merit.
First, Zivotofsky contends that section
214(d) remedies the State Department's
discriminatory policy against supporters of
Israel. He notes that an individual born in
Tel Aviv or Haifa after 1948 may list as his
place of birth either "Israel" or his local
birthplace if he objects to including "Israel."
An individual born in Jerusalem after 1948,
as we have discussed, may not choose
between a country and a locality; rather, his
place of birth must be listed as "Jerusalem."
Zivotofsky laments that "[n]o matter where
in Jerusalem an American citizen may be
born . . . he or she does not have the option
given to American citizens born in Tel Aviv
or Haifa to choose whether to record the
country or city of birth." We do not decide
the merits of this contention because
Zivotofsky did not make it in district court
and it is therefore waived.

Second, Zivotofsky argues that President
George W. Bush's signing statement —
indicating that section 214 is, in his view,
unconstitutional — is invalid because he
should have instead vetoed the enactment to
register his objection. The signing statement
is irrelevant…
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the district court dismissing the
complaint on the alternative ground that
section 214(d) impermissibly infringes on
the President's exercise of the recognition
power reposing exclusively in him under the
Constitution
and
is
therefore
unconstitutional.
So ordered.
TATEL, Circuit Judge, concurring:
Although I concur fully in the court's
opinion, I write separately to elucidate my
thinking about the important and novel
separation-of-powers question this case
presents. The Secretary's argument that
Section 214(d) is unconstitutional turns on
two subsidiary arguments: first, that the
power to recognize foreign sovereigns
belongs to the President alone; and second,
that Section 214(d) interferes with the
President's exclusive exercise of that power.
But I think it best to begin with an issue that
underlies and helps frame these recognition
power questions, namely, Congress's socalled passport power.
I.
It is beyond dispute that Congress's
immigration, foreign commerce, and
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naturalization powers authorize it to regulate
passports. Zivotofsky would have us stop
there. He reasons that because Congress has
the power to regulate passports and because
Section 214(d) is passport legislation, the
statute is constitutional. This argument,
however, overlooks the independent
limitations the Constitution imposes even on
legislation within Congress's enumerated
powers… For example, the Commerce
Clause authorizes Congress to regulate
interstate
communications,
but
a
communications statute may nevertheless
run afoul of the First Amendment.
The fact that Congress has affirmative
authority to regulate passports thus does not
resolve the question of whether Section
214(d) comports with the separation of
powers… Congress has authority to regulate
passports; we need only decide whether this
particular exercise of that authority, Section
214(d), infringes on the Executive's
recognition power.
II.
As I noted at the outset, in order to
demonstrate that Section 214(d) is
unconstitutional the Secretary must begin by
establishing that the recognition power in
fact inheres exclusively in the President.
This is because, as the court explains, a
President
may
"take[]
measures
incompatible with the expressed . . . will of
Congress" only when he acts pursuant to an
"exclusive" Executive power. If the
Constitution entrusts the recognition power
exclusively to the President, as the Secretary
claims, there remains the even more difficult

question of whether Section 214(d) intrudes
upon his exercise of that power. In resolving
both questions, we find ourselves in
relatively uncharted waters with few fixed
stars by which to navigate.
A.
I have little to add to the court's thorough
discussion of whether the Constitution
endows the President with exclusive power
to recognize foreign sovereigns. As the court
details, there is scant constitutional text to
guide us and little contemporaneous
evidence of the Framers' intent… To be
sure, throughout our history Congress has
often acquiesced in a President's unilateral
recognition of a foreign sovereign… But
neither party (nor any of the amici) points to
any time in our history when the President
and Congress have clashed over an issue of
recognition.
Given all that, it is unsurprising that the
Supreme Court has had no occasion to
definitively resolve the political branches'
competing claims to recognition power.
True, the Court has consistently and clearly
stated that courts have no authority to
second-guess recognition decisions. And in
so doing, it has often referred to the
recognition power as inhering exclusively in
the Executive. That said, the Court has also
occasionally suggested that Congress and
the President share that power. Significantly
for our purposes, the Court has made many
more statements falling in the former
category than in the latter…
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To say that the question has yet to be
conclusively answered, however, is not to
say — at least from the perspective of this
"inferior" court — that the answer is
unclear. All told, given the great weight of
historical and legal precedent and given that
"carefully considered language of the
Supreme Court, even if technically dictum,
generally must be treated as authoritative,"
we are compelled to conclude that
"[p]olitical recognition is exclusively a
function of the Executive."
B.
The critical question, then, is whether
Section 214(d) in fact infringes on the
President's exclusive authority to recognize
foreign sovereigns. The Secretary's position
is straightforward: By preventing passport
holders from identifying a place of birth that
conflicts with the President's recognition
determinations, the Secretary's place-ofbirth policy implicates recognition. This is
all the more evident in the context of
Jerusalem. As Judge Edwards put it, "The
Secretary's rules regarding the designation
of Jerusalem on passports . . . plainly
implement the Executive's determination not
to recognize Jerusalem as part of any
sovereign regime." Given that the
Secretary's place-of-birth policy implicates
the recognition power and given that Section
214(d) displaces that policy, the Secretary
reasons, the statute unconstitutionally
intrudes on the President's recognition
power.
Zivotofsky sees things differently. His first
and broadest contention is that the

President's recognition power, even if
exclusive, does not include the power to
determine whether certain territory belongs
to a particular foreign state. The recognition
power may give the President authority to
decide whether to recognize a foreign entity
as a sovereign, he argues, but it includes no
authority to determine that sovereign state's
territorial boundaries. This line of argument
falls well short of its mark. The power to
recognize a sovereign state's territorial
boundaries is a necessary corollary to the
power to recognize a sovereign in the first
place. For instance, recognizing an
established sovereign's former colony as a
new, independent sovereign seems a
straightforward exercise of what even
Zivotofsky would concede to be the
recognition power. But such recognition
necessarily entails a boundary determination
— the colony, once formally recognized as
part of one sovereign's territory, is
effectively recognized as belonging to
another. Indeed, precedent binding on this
court confirms that the recognition power
includes authority to determine territorial
boundaries.
Zivotofsky's narrower argument, powerfully
developed in amicus briefs submitted by
members of Congress and the AntiDefamation League, is much stronger.
Letting Jerusalem-born individuals choose
to designate "Israel" as their place of birth,
he contends, neither effects a recognition of
Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem nor
otherwise interferes with the President's
recognition power. As he emphasizes,
nothing in Section 214(d) requires the
Secretary to list "Israel" as the place of birth
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for all Jerusalem-born U.S. citizens. Rather,
it merely enables those Jerusalem-born
citizens who support Israel to choose to
designate their place of birth consistently
with that view. Aside from the Secretary's
say-so, Zivotofsky goes on to argue, there is
simply no reason to conclude that the
statute's limited interference with the way
the Secretary records a passport holder's
place of birth implicates the recognition
power. Nor is there reason to believe that
implementing Section 214(d) would
adversely affect foreign policy. Because
affected passports would list "Israel" — not
"Jerusalem, Israel" — observers would
discern no U.S. policy identifying Jerusalem
as part of Israel.
What makes this case difficult is that
Zivotofsky is partly right. As the Secretary
concedes, a primary purpose of the place-ofbirth field is to enable the government to
identify particular individuals — e.g., by
distinguishing one Jane Doe from another
born the very same day. And the fact that the
Secretary permits individuals to choose to
list a city or area of birth instead of a
country of birth does tend to suggest that its
place-of-birth policy is also about personal
identity.
That the Secretary's policy is about
identification
and
personal
identity,
however, does not mean that it does not also
implicate recognition. In fact, it clearly does.
Over the years, the Secretary has been
incredibly consistent on this point: in no
circumstances — including circumstances
beyond the Jerusalem issue — can an
individual opt for a place-of-birth

designation inconsistent with United States
recognition policy. For example, because the
United States never recognized the Soviet
Union's annexation of Latvia, Lithuania, and
Estonia, the Secretary "did not authorize
entry of 'U.S.S.R.' or the 'Soviet Union' as a
place of birth" for people born in these
areas. Zivotofsky identifies no deviation
from this policy, nor am I aware of one. The
Taiwan directive to which Zivotofsky
repeatedly points only underscores the
Secretary's consistency. Because the United
States recognizes Taiwan as an area within
China, permitting individuals to list
"Taiwan" as their place of birth comports
with the Secretary's general policy.
Moreover, one cannot possibly read the
Foreign Affairs Manual's application of that
policy to Jerusalem as anything but an
attempt to maintain consistency between the
place-of-birth field and the President's
decision to recognize no sovereign's claim to
that city.
That the Secretary accommodates identity
preferences to the extent they are consistent
with recognition policy does little to
undermine his position that the place-ofbirth field in fact implicates recognition. The
Secretary has consistently walked a careful
line, permitting individual choice where
possible while still ensuring consistency
with foreign policy. Because the Secretary's
policy is about both identification and
recognition, Congress could probably pass
some laws about the place-of-birth field that
do not interfere with the recognition power.
For instance, Congress might be able to do
little things, like require that the place of
birth be listed in a particular font. It might
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even be able to do bigger things, like
eliminate the place-of-birth field all
together. Although doing so would inhibit
identification of passport holders, it would
not seem to interfere with the President's
recognition power.
But in enacting Section 214(d), Congress
did intrude on the recognition power. The
statute seeks to abrogate the Secretary's
longstanding practice of precluding placeof-birth designations that are inconsistent
with U.S. recognition policy. According to
the Secretary, Section 214(d) would also
have consequences for the President's
carefully guarded neutrality on the question
of
Jerusalem.
Although
Zivotofsky
challenges the President's judgment that
adverse foreign policy consequences would
flow from implementing Section 214(d), he
offers no reason why the President's exercise
of his constitutional power to recognize
foreign sovereigns should hinge on a
showing of adverse consequences. Even
more importantly, courts are not in the
business of second-guessing the President's
reasonable foreign policy judgments, and
this one is perfectly reasonable. After all,
"[a] passport is, in a sense, a letter of
introduction in which the issuing sovereign
vouches for the bearer." And it is certainly
plausible, as the Secretary insists, that
American-issued passports listing "Israel" as
the place of birth for Jerusalem-born citizens
could disrupt decades of considered
neutrality on the Jerusalem question.
If this were all we had — only the
Secretary's reasonable judgment that Section
214(d) infringes on the Executive's

exclusive recognition power — it might well
be enough. After all, the Supreme Court has
held that the recognition power "includes the
power to determine the policy which is to
govern the question of recognition." But
there is more. As it turns out, this is not a
case in which we must choose between the
President's characterization of a statute as
implicating recognition and Congress's
contrary view. Indeed, Congress was quite
candid about what it was doing when it
enacted Section 214(d). That subsection is
part of a provision titled "United States
policy with respect to Jerusalem as the
capital of Israel." The other sections under
that heading are not about passports, they
are about recognizing Jerusalem as part of
— indeed, as the capital of — Israel. And
the legislative history makes doubly clear
that recognition was Congress's goal.
So in the end, this is a separation-of-powers
dispute in which both branches involved in
the struggle actually agree. Congress
intended Section 214(d) to alter recognition
policy with respect to Jerusalem, and the
President sees it the same way. Our decision
makes us the third and final branch to reach
this conclusion. And because the recognition
power belongs exclusively to the President,
that
means
Section
214(d)
is
unconstitutional.
III.
Although the foregoing analysis largely
resolves this case, there is one loose end I
think merits mention: Zivotofsky's argument
that the Secretary's place-of-birth policy
discriminates against supporters of Israel. In
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its most effective formulation, I take the
point as follows: Under the Secretary's
policy, supporters of Palestine born in Tel
Aviv can use their passports to signal their
rejection of Israel's claim to sovereignty by
choosing to list "Tel Aviv" instead of
"Israel" as their place of birth. By contrast,
supporters of Israel born in Jerusalem cannot
use their passports to signal their view that
Jerusalem is part of Israel. Thus, the policy
discriminates against Israel supporters, and
Section 214(d) remedies that discrimination.

of birth. The policy applies universally —
not just in the context of Jerusalem — and
treats Israel and Palestine supporters
identically. Jerusalem-born Americans,
whether supporters of Israel or supporters of
Palestine, may not use their passports to
make a political statement. And that is
because permitting a Jerusalem-born
individual to list "Israel" or "Palestine"
would contradict the President's decision to
recognize neither entity's sovereignty over
Jerusalem.

To the extent this is an independent claim
that the Secretary's policy is discriminatory,
I agree it is waived. To the extent the
argument is that Section 214(d) is
constitutional because it remedies unlawful
discrimination, such argument cannot
overcome the recognition power problem for
the same reason the passport power
argument cannot: legislation Congress
would otherwise have authority to enact may
still run afoul of an independent
constitutional restraint on congressional
action.

True, as Zivotofsky emphasizes with his Tel
Aviv example, individuals born within
territory the United States has recognized as
belonging to Israel can choose either to list
"Israel" as their place of birth or instead to
list a city or area of birth. Israel supporters
may list "Israel," and Palestine supporters
may list something more specific. But
although the political nature of the latter
choice may be clearer insomuch as it marks
a deviation from the default country-of-birth
rule, that is an unintended consequence of a
neutral policy. Indeed, were the United
States to recognize the West Bank as the
sovereign state of Palestine, the same would
be true of Israel supporters born therein.
That is, Palestine supporters could list
"Palestine," and Israel supporters could
make the more obviously political choice to
list their city or area of birth. It is only
because the United States has not recognized
any Palestinian territory that there currently
exists no clear analogy to Zivotofsky's Tel
Aviv scenario.

I nonetheless think it important to note that
the policy is not discriminatory. Indeed,
unlike Section 214(d), which permits
Jerusalem-born Israel supporters to list
"Israel" as their place of birth but allows no
parallel option for Jerusalem-born Palestine
supporters, the State Department's Foreign
Affairs Manual establishes a facially neutral
policy that permits individuals to list their
city or area of birth in lieu of their country
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“U.S. Supreme Court to Review Jerusalem Birthplace Law”
Reuters
Lawrence Hurley
April 21, 2014
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed
to weigh the constitutionality of a law that
was designed to allow American citizens
born in Jerusalem - the historic holy city
claimed by Israelis and Palestinians - to
have Israel listed as their birthplace on
passports.
The case concerns a long-standing U.S.
foreign policy that the president - and not
Congress - has sole authority to state who
controls Jerusalem. Seeking to remain
neutral on the hotly contested issue, the U.S.
State Department allows passports to name
Jerusalem as a place of birth, but no country
name is included.
The State Department, which issues
passports and reports to the president, has
declined to enforce the law passed by
Congress in 2002, saying it violated the
separation of executive and legislative
powers laid out in the U.S. Constitution.
In court papers, President Barack Obama's
administration said taking sides on the issue
could "critically compromise the ability of
the United States to work with Israelis,
Palestinians and others in the region to
further the peace process."
The government has noted that U.S. citizens
born in other places in the region where
sovereignty has not been established,
including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,

are similarly prevented from stating a
country of birth on their passports.
In 2003, Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky, the
parents of U.S. citizen Menachem
Zivotofsky, who was born in Jerusalem in
2002, filed a lawsuit seeking to enforce the
law. They would like their son's passport to
say he was born in Israel.
Since the founding of Israel in 1948, U.S.
presidents have declined to state a position
on the status of Jerusalem, leaving it as one
of the thorniest issues to be resolved in
possible future Israeli-Palestinian peace
talks.
When Republican President George W.
Bush signed the 2002 law as part of a
broader foreign affairs bill, he said that if
construed as mandatory rather than advisory,
it would "impermissibly interfere" with the
president's authority to speak for the country
on international affairs.
The issue reached the U.S. Supreme Court
in 2012 on the preliminary question of
whether it was so political that it did not
belong in the courts. The high court ruled 81 that the case could proceed, setting up a
July 2013 ruling by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
that struck the law down.
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An estimated 50,000 American citizens were
born in Jerusalem and could, if they
requested it, list Israel as their birthplace if
the law was enforced.
While Israel calls Jerusalem its capital, few
other countries accept that status. Most,
including the United States, maintain their
embassies to Israel in Tel Aviv. Palestinians
want East Jerusalem, captured by Israel in a

1967 war, as capital of the state they aim to
establish alongside Israel in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip.
Oral arguments and a decision are due in the
court's next term, which begins in October
and ends in June 2015.
The case is Zivotofsky v. Kerry, U.S.
Supreme Court, 13-628.
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“Law Giving Jerusalem-Born U.S. Citizens an
Israeli Birthplace Under Review”
CNN
Bill Mears
April 21, 2014
The U.S. Supreme Court will take another
look at an 11-year-old boy's request to have
Israel listed as his place of birth on his U.S.
passport.
The justices announced Monday they would
review a federal law giving that special right
to those like young Menachem Zivotofsky,
who were born in Jerusalem.
But that is a disputed region in the eyes of
the Obama administration, which said the
larger issue should be resolved by bilateral
negotiations, not by a 2002 congressional
action favoring the family and the more than
50,000 other Americans born in the holy
city.
Oral arguments by the high court will be
held in the fall.

The city is home to Ari and Naomi
Zivotofsky. The couple and their two oldest
children were born in the United States, but
the family migrated to West Jerusalem more
than a dozen years ago, and in 2002 the
youngest, Menachem Binyamin, was born.
The boy's mother made the "Israel" request
about two months after his birth, but
embassy officials refused. The disputed
passport shows his round, innocent face, and
"Jerusalem" is listed as his place of birth.
"We're very proud of the fact that he was
born in Israel and that we live in Israel and
it's the modern state of Israel," Ari
Zivotofsky told CNN in 2012. "Religiously
and historically, that's very significant."

The case is a classic fight between
congressional and executive authority, with
foreign policy the source of the current
controversy.

Just three weeks before Menachem was
born, the U.S. Congress gave American
citizens born in Jerusalem the individual
discretion to ask that Israel be listed on
passports and consular reports, where it says
"Place of Birth." President George W. Bush
signed the bill but issued an executive
"signing statement" indicating he would not
comply.

U.S. policy does not recognize any country
as having sovereignty over Jerusalem. Two
years ago, the justices allowed the family's
federal lawsuit to proceed.

It is not the first time Congress and the
White House have clashed over the region.
The U.S. Embassy remains in Tel Aviv, over
U.S. lawmakers' objections.

At issue is whether the statute interferes
with the president's power to recognize an
independent sovereign.
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The government is thinking of the bigger
picture. State Department officials would
not comment on the record on a pending
case, but President Barack Obama has
acknowledged the stalled peace process has
created divisions in that region and in the
United States.
The high court case is Zivotofsky v. Kerry,
but the key player in this dispute is perhaps
the most famous city in the world, and one
of the oldest human settlements still in
existence: Jerusalem. Its name translates as
"City of Peace" to some, "Holy Sanctuary"
to others. Jerusalem is Israel's largest city,
and the nation calls it its capital, though that
is not recognized by the United Nations and
most of the world community.
Divided into East Jerusalem (populated
mostly by Muslims) and West Jerusalem

(populated mostly by Jews), the city spans
over 48 square miles (124 square
kilometers), with about 775,000 people.
The terms "East" and "West" come layered
with political, social, religious and
geographic questions -- amorphous, often
misleading terms, symbolic of the larger
struggle for control and recognition of all
that this city represents. Some use the terms
"Jewish" or "Arab" Jerusalem to refer to the
sections.
The Old City is the heart of the region, a
holy symbol to the three major Abrahamic
religions: Christianity, Islam and Judaism.
That tiny area -- just a third of one square
mile -- contains the Temple Mount, Western
Wall, Church of the Holy Sepulcher, Dome
of the Rock and al-Aqsa Mosque.
The case is Zivotofsky v. Kerry (13-628).
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“Court Bars 'Jerusalem, Israel' as Birthplace on American Passports”
LA Times
Alexei Koseff
July 23, 2013
American citizens born in Jerusalem cannot
claim Israel as their place of birth on their
passports, a federal appeals court in
Washington ruled Tuesday.
A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
unanimously declared unconstitutional a
2002 law that required the State Department
to record Israel as the birthplace of
Jerusalem-born citizens despite a longstanding position in the executive branch of
strict neutrality toward sovereignty of the
disputed city.
At stake in the case was a question of
governmental authority over foreign policy:
Does the president have the sole right to
decide on what terms foreign nations are
recognized?
Though the United States has recognized the
sovereignty of Israel since it declared
independence in 1948, no president has ever
taken a position on Jerusalem. Israel
considers the city its political and spiritual
capital, while Palestinians seek to make East
Jerusalem the capital of a future country.
The case was brought by the family of
Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky, now 10,
born to American parents in Jerusalem.
When his mother applied for a passport for
him with the birthplace as "Jerusalem,

Israel," the U.S. Consulate listed only
"Jerusalem."
Zivotofsky was born weeks after Congress
passed the passport provision in September
2002 as part of a foreign relations
appropriations bill.
But when President George W. Bush signed
the law, he issued an executive statement
asserting that the policy on Jerusalem, if
construed as mandatory rather than advisory,
would "impermissibly interfere" with the
president's constitutional authority in
matters of foreign affairs.
The Secretary of State has never enforced
the policy, arguing that it intrudes upon
presidential powers.
The Court of Appeals agreed in its ruling,
stating that the law was a political act that
infringed upon the president's exclusive
recognition power in the Constitution.
The law "is not, as Zivotofsky asserts,
legislation that simply — and neutrally —
regulates the form and content of a
passport," Circuit Judge Karen Henderson
wrote in her opinion. "Congress plainly
intended to force the State Department to
deviate from its decades-long position of
neutrality" toward Jerusalem.
Several groups swiftly decried the decision.
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The Anti-Defamation League, which
combats anti-Semitism, wrote in a statement
that it was "deeply disappointed" by the
news.
"The court has effectively given a stamp of
approval to the offensive State Department
policy that singles out Israel for 'special'
treatment," it wrote.
In a statement, the Orthodox Union, an
umbrella group of Orthodox Jewish
congregations, called Jerusalem "the eternal

and indivisible capital of the State of Israel"
and said it would support an appeal of the
ruling to the Supreme Court.
Congress has long demanded recognition of
Israel's sovereign control over Jerusalem. In
1995, it passed a law requiring that the
United States move its embassy from Tel
Aviv to Jerusalem, an act that has since been
suspended on a semiannual basis by the
president for national security reasons.
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NEW TOPIC: CONGRESS & THE OBAMA WHITE HOUSE
“Supreme Court Rebukes Obama on Right of Appointment”
New York Times
Adam Liptak
June 26, 2014
adjudication of the balance of power
The Supreme Court issued a unanimous
between the president and the Senate.
rebuke to President Obama on Thursday,
saying he had overreached in issuing recess
Just how to strike that balance was the
appointments during brief breaks in the
subject of a heated dispute between the
Senate’s work.
court’s more liberal members and its more
conservative ones.
Mr. Obama violated the Constitution in
2012, the justices said, by appointing
officials to the National Labor Relations
Board during a break in the Senate’s work
when the chamber was convening every
three days in short pro forma sessions in
which no business was conducted. Those
breaks were too short, Justice Stephen G.
Breyer wrote in a majority opinion joined by
the court’s four other more liberal members.
At the same time, the court largely reinstated
an uneasy, centuries-long accommodation
between the executive branch and the
Senate, in which recess appointments were
allowed during more substantial breaks.
Justice Breyer said such appointments
generally remained permissible so long as
they were made during breaks of 10 or more
days.
Although there may be few immediate
practical consequences of the ruling, given
the recent overhaul of the Senate’s filibuster
rules, the decision was nonetheless
momentous, involving a constitutional

The practical impact of the ruling over time
“remains to be seen,” Justice Antonin Scalia
said in a concurrence. Many experts say that
if either house of Congress is controlled by
the party opposed to the president,
lawmakers can effectively block recess
appointments by requiring pro forma
sessions every three days. The Constitution
says that each house must get the approval
of the other chamber to adjourn for more
than three days.
But Justice Scalia was skeptical, noting that
the president had the constitutional power to
set adjournments when the chambers
disagreed.
What was certain, he said, was that the court
had endorsed a vast expansion of executive
power. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and
Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel A.
Alito Jr. joined the concurrence, which was
caustic and despairing.
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“The court’s decision transforms the recessappointment power from a tool carefully
designed to fill a narrow and specific need,”
Justice Scalia wrote, “into a weapon to be
wielded by future presidents against future
Senates.”
If it was hard to assess the immediate
consequences, there was no question that
Mr. Obama narrowly avoided a far broader
loss, one that could have limited recess
appointments to breaks between Congress’s
formal annual sessions, and even then to
vacancies that arose during those breaks.
That was the approach embraced by the
court’s four most conservative members.
“The majority practically bends over
backwards
to
ensure
that
recess
appointments will remain a powerful
weapon in the president’s arsenal,” Justice
Scalia said from the bench.
The decision affirmed a broad ruling last
year by a federal appeals court in
Washington that had called into question the
constitutionality
of
many
recess
appointments by presidents of both parties.
But the Supreme Court majority rejected the
appeals court’s reading of the constitutional
text, relying instead on historical practices
and pragmatic considerations.
Josh Earnest, the White House Press
Secretary, expressed dismay and satisfaction
in equal measure. “We’re of course deeply
disappointed in today’s decision,” he said.
But Mr. Earnest added that the White House
was “pleased that the court recognized the
president’s executive authority as exercised

by presidents going all the way back to
George Washington.”
Miguel Estrada, a lawyer for Senator Mitch
McConnell of Kentucky, the Republican
leader, said the decision was a victory for
the Senate and the separation of powers.
“The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Senate’s
power to prescribe its own rules, including
the right to determine for itself when it is in
session, and rejected the president’s
completely unprecedented assertion of
unilateral appointment power,” he said.
The issue of recess appointments and what
they are meant to accomplish — installing a
controversial nominee by circumventing the
confirmation process — is largely a moot
one on Capitol Hill. Because Senate
Democrats late last year changed the rules
governing how nominees are approved and
made it far easier for the president to get his
officials confirmed, there is not much need
for a recess appointment for now.
The Constitution’s recess-appointments
clause says, “The president shall have power
to fill up all vacancies that may happen
during the recess of the Senate.”
Analyzing that language, a three-judge panel
of the appeals court said that presidents may
bypass the Senate only during the recesses
between formal sessions of Congress. Two
of the judges went further, saying that
presidents may fill only vacancies that came
up during that same recess.
The case arose from a labor dispute
involving a soft-drink bottling company,
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Noel Canning. The labor board ruled against
the company, saying it had engaged in an
unfair labor practice by refusing to enter into
a collective bargaining agreement.
The company appealed, arguing that the
labor board had been powerless to rule
because a majority of its members had been
appointed during a 20-day stretch when the
Senate was convening every three days in
pro forma sessions without conducting
business. Mr. Obama, who viewed the
sessions as a tactic to keep the Senate open
so he could not make recess appointments,
made the appointments anyway.
Since three members of the board — Sharon
Block, Terence F. Flynn and Richard F.
Griffin Jr. — had not been properly
appointed, the company argued, its ruling
was void.
In asking the Supreme Court to review the
appeals court’s ruling in the case, National
Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning, No.
12-1281, the Obama administration sought
answers to only the broader questions
decided by the appeals court. But the
Supreme Court agreed to answer a narrower
question, too: whether the president may
make recess appointments when the Senate
is convening every three days in pro forma
sessions.
That was the question on which the
administration lost.
The board issued 436 decisions during the
18 months when Mr. Obama’s improperly
appointed employees worked there. Gregory

J. King, a spokesman for the labor board,
said there remained about 100 cases on hold
in federal appeals courts awaiting a Supreme
Court decision about the legitimacy of the
recess appointees. In those cases, the
appellants are challenging decisions from
when the board had the contested
appointees; they assert that the board did not
have a legitimate quorum to issue those
decisions.
The great majority of those board decisions
may be negated by Thursday’s ruling by the
Supreme Court. At the request of the
litigants, many of those cases will be
returned to — and reviewed by — the
current board, which has a full contingent of
five members duly confirmed by the Senate.
Because the board has a 3-2 Democratic
majority, the current board is likely to affirm
nearly all or all of the rulings, legal experts
said.
Both sides in Thursday’s decision relied
heavily on history. Justice Breyer noted
many examples of recess appointments
made during formal sessions of the Senate,
some of which filled vacancies that had
arisen before the break in question. “Justice
Scalia would render illegitimate thousands
of recess appointments reaching all the way
back to the founding era,” Justice Breyer
wrote.
But he added that the earlier breaks were not
as brief as the ones at issue. “We have not
found a single example of a recess
appointment made during an intra-session
recess that was shorter than 10 days,” Justice
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Breyer wrote in explaining why the court
had adopted that criterion.
The 10-day rule was not absolute, he added,
as a national emergency might require faster
action. But he said that “political opposition
in the Senate would not qualify as an
unusual circumstance.”

Justice Scalia said all of this was arbitrary.
“These new rules have no basis whatsoever
in the Constitution,” he said from the bench.
“They are just made up.”
“What the majority needs to sustain its
judgment is an ambiguous text and a clear
historical practice,” he wrote. “What it has is
clear text and an at-best-ambiguous
historical practice.”
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“The Supreme Court’s Noel Canning Decision and the NLRB’s Response”
Mondaq
Mark L. Shapiro, David Santeusanio & Brian M. Doyle
July 17, 2014
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed a
decision by the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals on June 26, 2014, invalidating
President Obama's appointment in January
2012 of three members to the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB or "board").
National Labor Relations Board v. Noel
Canning, No. 12-1281 (June 26, 2014). The
decision raises uncertainty concerning the
validity of NLRB decisions, rulings and
administrative actions issued since President
Obama made the appointments. Since the
Supreme Court's decision, NLRB has taken
quick action to address the decision,
including setting aside certain board
decisions on appeal to the federal circuit
courts and filing motions in other cases
asking the courts to vacate and remand the
cases to the board. This alert describes the
Supreme Court's decision and the NLRB's
initial response.
Noel Canning Case Background
The Noel Canning Corporation, a
Washington state bottling company, first
raised the issue of the authority of the recess
appointments in connection with its defense
of an unfair labor practices charge. The
NLRB concluded that Noel Canning
committed an unfair labor practice, and Noel
Canning appealed the decision to the D.C.
Circuit, arguing that the board lacked the
authority to issue the ruling because it was

not comprised of constitutionally appointed
board members. At that time, the board
consisted of three members appointed by
President Obama in January 2012 pursuant
to the Recess Appointments Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.
In January 2013, the D.C. Circuit issued its
decision in Noel Canning v. NLRB, ruling
that
President
Obama's
"recess
appointments" to the NLRB were
unconstitutional. The court concluded that
the three "recess" appointments made by the
president in January 2012 were invalid on
two grounds.
•
First, the court held that recess
appointments may only be made during the
recess between each session of Congress (an
intersession recess, which happens only
once per year), rather than on a break in
Congress that occurs while Congress is still
in session (an intrasession recess, which
occurs rather frequently, such as during
holidays).
•
Second, the court held that recess
appointments can be made to fill only those
positions that become vacant during the
recess, such that the president cannot make
recess appointments to fill preexisting or
long-standing vacancies. The NLRB
appealed the decision to the Supreme Court,
which issued its unanimous decision on June
26, 2014, affirming the opinion of the D.C.
Circuit.
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The Supreme Court affirmed the D.C.
Circuit's judgment, but its reasoning was
different.
•
First, and contrary to the D.C.
Circuit's opinion, the Supreme Court held
that the Recess Appointments Clause
empowers the president to fill any existing
vacancy during any recess of sufficient
length – regardless of whether it is
intrasession or intersession.
•
Second, and also contrary to the D.C.
Circuit's opinion, the Supreme Court held
that the phrase "vacancies that may happen
during the recess of the Senate" includes
both vacancies that arise while the Senate is
in recess and vacancies that already exist at
the time the Senate goes into recess.
Despite disagreeing with the reasoning of
the D.C. Circuit's opinion, the Supreme
Court ultimately affirmed the decision on a
separate basis. The Supreme Court
concluded that for purposes of the Recess
Appointments Clause, the Senate is in
session when it says that it is, provided that,
under its own rules, the Senate is able to
conduct Senate business. However, the
Senate was not, in fact, in a "recess" when
the president invoked the Recess
Appointments Clause in January 2012.
Instead, the Senate had passed a resolution
providing for a series of pro forma sessions
in which it decided that it would not transact
any business, although, as the Supreme
Court concluded, it remained capable of
doing so. The president made his
appointments during a three-day break
between two of the pro forma sessions,
which the Supreme Court ruled was
presumptively too short a period of time to

bring the recess within the scope of the
Recess Appointments Clause.
Impact on Board Decisions and the
NLRB's Response
The Supreme Court's decision has an
immediate impact in favor of Noel Canning,
which invalidates the adverse board decision
finding that Noel Canning engaged in an
unfair labor practice. The decision also has
an immediate impact on the board decisions
– including high-profile and controversial
decisions – that the board decided between
Jan. 4, 2012 (the day of the recess
appointments), and Aug. 5, 2013 (the day
the Senate confirmed nominations for the
three board positions). Many of those cases
are currently working their way through the
federal court system. As for those board
decisions that are not currently pending in
federal court, it is not immediately clear how
this decision will affect those proceedings.
Since the Supreme Court's decision, NLRB
has taken steps in response. On the day the
Supreme Court decided the case, NLRB
Chairman Mark Gaston Pearce issued a
statement saying that the board is "analyzing
the impact that the Court's decision has on
Board cases in which the January 2012
recess appointees participated." He further
stated that the board "is committed to
resolving any cases affected by today's
decision as expeditiously as possible."
Then, at a July 9, 2014, ABA webinar,
NLRB General Counsel Richard Griffin
explained the actions the board had taken in
response to the decision. He stated that in
the federal appeals courts, there were 98
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cases involving the recess appointees. In 43
of those cases, the board had not yet filed
the records of NLRB proceedings. Section
10(d) of the National Labor Relations Act
states that until the record of the case is filed
in the court, "the Board may at any time,
upon reasonable notice and in such manner
as it deems proper, modify or set aside, in
whole or in part, any findings or order made
or issued by it." Griffin explained that under
Section 10(d), the NLRB will modify or set
aside the orders in those cases. Of the
remaining 55 cases (in which the board
record has already been filed with the court),
the board has filed motions in 49 of the
cases asking the court to vacate and remand
the cases to the board.
Griffin further explained that other cases
affected by the Noel Canning decision had
not proceeded to the court of appeals. Of
those cases, the general counsel may seek to
return some of those cases to the NLRB or,
if the parties have no interest in having the
NLRB further address the dispute (because
for example, the dispute was resolved), the
cases would not return to the board and no
further action would be taken. He also
explained that the board is still addressing
the issue of the board's appointment of
regional directors and the validity of their
actions. The board will continue to address
the short-term and long-term consequences
of the Noel Canning decision.
The decision and the board's initial response
show the complexities and administrative
burdens associated with this issue. This is
not the first time that the board has
confronted a similar issue. After the

Supreme Court's decision in New Process
Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, in which the Court
concluded that the board lacked authority to
issue decisions without a quorum of at least
three members, the board simply re-issued
the decisions that were previously rendered
by a delegated two-member panel, after it
obtained quorum. Given the composition of
the current board – three pro-labor members
on a five-member board – it is likely that
any decisions revisited by the board will be
affirmed.
Questions Remain About the Validity of
Other NLRB Actions
Practically, many of the board's decisions
have resulted in orders that have already
been implemented for over two years,
including the negotiations of contracts and
the hiring of workers. It would be difficult to
undo what has already been done. But the
Supreme Court's decision raises questions as
to the validity of other actions taken by the
board, including the appointment of those
regional directors who were appointed
during the relevant time and the
promulgation of new rules. In addition, there
may be arguments that decisions rendered
by a regional director appointed by an
unconstitutional board are also invalid.
Given the administrative burdens associated
with addressing the effects of the Noel
Canning decision, case backlogs and related
delays will likely occur at NLRB in the near
future.
Although the Supreme Court's decision has
provided clarity to Noel Canning and
resulted in immediate action by NLRB in
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those cases currently pending in federal
court, there remain questions that employers
should assess with counsel concerning the
reach of the decision. There is also the
political question of what happens the next
time there is a vacancy on the board and
opposite parties control the White House
and the Senate. The next board vacancy will
occur on Dec. 16, 2014 (when the term of
Democrat member Nancy Schiffer will
expire), leaving a two-two split between
Democratic and Republican board members.
In connection with that upcoming vacancy,
President Obama on July 10, 2014, renominated Democrat Sharon Block, one of
the three recess appointments invalidated by

the Noel Canning decision. Political
maneuvering on the vacancy, coupled with
the current fallout of the Noel Canning
decision, will likely continue to affect the
NLRB.
To ensure compliance with Treasury
Regulations, we inform you that any tax
advice contained in this correspondence was
not intended or written by us to be used, and
cannot be used by you or anyone else, for
the purpose of avoiding penalties imposed
by the Internal Revenue Code.
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“Counsel Rests”
Slate
Neal Devins
January 13, 2014
At oral arguments Monday on President
Obama’s recess appointment power, Senate
Republicans locked horns with Obama’s
Department of Justice. The Office of Senate
Legal Counsel is not participating in the suit,
even though it involves the Senate directly.
Instead, the justices agreed to a request by
Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell to
participate in the oral argument.
Last year, it was House Republicans locking
horns with the Obama Justice Department.
In defending the constitutionality of the
Defense of Marriage Act before the
Supreme Court, the House Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group actually spoke only for
House Republicans. Indeed, 132 House
Democrats filed an amicus brief in that
appeal, arguing both that DOMA was
unconstitutional and that the House counsel
did not “speak for a unanimous House on
this issue.”
In Monday’s recess appointment case, why
would the Senate’s own lawyer sit on his
hands while the minority leader purports to
speak for the Senate? And why were House
Republicans Congress’s only voice in oral
arguments in the DOMA case? The answer
lies in the differences in the ways the House
and Senate can participate in litigation—
differences exacerbated by the polarization
of Democrats and Republicans in both the
House and Senate.

The Office of Senate Legal Counsel can
only participate in litigation with broad
bipartisan support. By statute, counsel
representation of the Senate requires twothirds support of a leadership group made up
of four members of the majority party and
three members of the minority party. This
supermajority requirement made perfect
sense back when the office was created in
1978.
Reflecting both Senate norms
favoring bipartisanship and Senate desires to
defend its institutional prerogatives in the
wake of Watergate, the Office of Senate
Legal Counsel was created to speak the
Senate’s collective voice in disputes with the
executive branch.
Throughout the 1980s, the Office of Senate
Legal Counsel defended the constitutionality
of federal statutes in several high-profile
disputes with the executive branch. In cases
involving the constitutionality of the
legislative veto, deficit-reduction legislation,
independent counsel investigations of highranking executive officials, and race
preferences in broadcasting, the Senate
counsel defended Congress’ institutional
prerogatives before the Supreme Court. In
some of these cases, Republican Ronald
Reagan was president, and the Senate
majority was also Republican. In other
words, 1980s Republicans were willing to
stand up to a Republican president to
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advance the institutional interests of the
Senate.
The recess appointment appeal being heard
Monday is precisely the type of case
Congress had in mind when it created the
Office of Senate Legal Counsel. The case
concerns the president’s power to fill
vacancies in the executive or judicial
branches, when the Senate is “in recess”—
and thus unable to hold a confirmation
hearing. The president, not surprisingly, has
a broad view of what constitutes a Senate
recess—to curb restraints on his power to
make recess appointments. In the abstract,
the Senate would be expected to have a
somewhat narrower view of what constitutes
a recess—so as to expand its own role in
confirmations. But in today’s polarized
Congress, Democrats and Republicans did
not come together to assert a shared
institutional view of what might constitute a
Senate recess. In particular, whereas Senate
Republicans are eager to assert their
institutional prerogatives against the
president, Senate Democrats seem altogether
unwilling to challenge Obama’s efforts to
use recess appointments to get his nominees
through the Senate.
The inability of Senate Republicans and
Democrats to come together is not
completely new. Since the 1995 Republican
takeover of Congress, the Senate counsel
has not participated in a single case in which
the Department of Justice has refused to
defend a federal statute. Indeed, I am aware
of no recent Senate–executive branch
dispute in which the Senate counsel has
gone to court to assert Senate prerogatives.

Instead, reflecting ever-increasing party
polarization in Congress, the Senate counsel
has been absolutely unable to speak with a
bipartisan voice in disputes with the
executive. In a 1993 lawsuit over a recess
appointment by then–lame duck President
George H.W. Bush, minority party Senate
Republicans blocked the filing of a brief that
would have defended the Senate’s
confirmation power.
The recess appointment case currently
before the Supreme Court takes matters one
step further. Instead of simply blocking
participation by the Senate counsel, Senate
Republicans banded together to defend
Senate prerogatives by limiting the scope of
presidential recess appointments. Ironically,
these same Senate Republicans set in motion
the very dispute now before the court.
Following a practice utilized by Senate
Democrats during the George W. Bush
administration, Senate Republicans sought
to block Obama recess appointments to the
National Labor Relations Board and other
government agencies by making use of socalled pro forma sessions—minutelong
sessions where a single lawmaker would
periodically gavel the Senate into session
during a break. In January 2012, President
Obama, claiming that the Senate was in
recess during one of these pro forma
sessions, made three recess appointments to
the NLRB. For the Obama administration,
these pro forma sessions were intended to
disrupt the constitutional balance of powers
between Senate and president; Senate
Republicans, instead, argue that the
president is simply seeking to “evade the
advice and consent protocol at his pleasure.”
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That the justices will hear only from the
Senate minority and not from the Senate
itself is truly unfortunate. The case, of
course, has extremely serious implications
for the balance of power between the
president and Senate. Given the recent fights
over the appointments process and the use of
the nuclear option, the Supreme Court’s
understanding of the real-world dynamic
between the Senate and president on recess
appointments might impact its final ruling in
the case. The fact that the Supreme Court
will hear only from the Senate minority
could shape the court’s understanding of this
dynamic.
And even if that is not the case, it is
certainly true that the justices will not know
whether the Senate itself thought it was in
session at the time of these appointments.
When the case was argued in the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, circuit judge and former Senate
counsel Thomas Griffith lamented the fact
that Senate counsel did not participate for
this very reason. As Griffith put it at the
time, “How do we know what the Senate’s
view is about the meaning of recess in terms
of the recess appointments clause? We
don’t.”
When it comes to the House, majority rules.
The House counsel essentially works for the
speaker of the House. The so-called
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group that
authorizes House counsel action is largely a
sham. In the DOMA case, for example,
BLAG divided along strictly partisan lines
to authorize House intervention in the case.
Likewise, BLAG divided along partisan

lines in 2000 when defending a federal
statute overturning Miranda v. Arizona.
In both cases, Democratic members filed
competing briefs to make clear that the
House BLAG was both wrong on the merits
and spoke only for the majority party.
BLAG’s own filings likewise acknowledged
that it represented only the views of the
majority party, stating that although it
“seeks consensus whenever possible, it
functions on a majoritarian basis, like the
institution it represents.”
Differences between today’s House and
Senate are also revealed in the willingness
for the House, but not the Senate, to go to
court to assert its institutional prerogatives
against the executive. With House rules
allowing a simple majority to invoke both
the contempt power and the filing of
lawsuits by the House counsel, the House is
likely to be a vigorous proponent for
congressional prerogatives when the
opposition party controls the White House.
In an ongoing dispute between the House
and Attorney General Eric Holder about the
“Fast and Furious” gun-running operation,
the Republican majority is seeking judicial
enforcement of a subpoena against the
attorney general. During the George W.
Bush administration, Democrats were in the
majority and similarly sought judicial
enforcement of subpoenas in a 2007 dispute
over the firing of U.S. attorneys.
Party polarization and House-Senate
differences are now a fact of life and,
apparently, so is the strange spectacle of the
Supreme Court hearing oral arguments from
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the House majority in the DOMA case and
the Senate minority in the recess
appointment case. Indeed, the bipartisanship
requirement that now makes it impossible
for the Senate counsel to participate in
litigation that divides the parties is
statutorily mandated, from a time when we
could imagine a Senate that could
sometimes agree.

It is even more urgent, therefore, that the
justices hearing the recess appointments
case recognize that they are only hearing
from the Senate minority —not the House,
not the Senate, and certainly not the entire
Congress.
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“House Votes to Authorize Boehner to Sue Obama”
Wall Street Journal
Michael R. Crittenden & Colleen McCain Nelson
July 20, 2014
House lawmakers voted Wednesday to
authorize Speaker John Boehner to file suit
against President Barack Obama on a
complaint that he had overstepped his legal
authority, setting up a possible constitutional
test and giving both parties a potent
campaign issue to take home for the fiveweek congressional recess.
In a 225-201 vote, the House told Mr.
Boehner (R., Ohio) to move ahead with the
suit. House GOP leaders have said they
would focus the suit on the White House's
decision last year to give employers a oneyear reprieve on enforcing a requirement
under the Affordable Care Act that they
offer health coverage or pay a penalty. The
requirement was delayed until 2015, and the
White House then revised the health law
further by saying employers with between
50 and 99 full-time workers wouldn't have
to comply or pay a fee until 2016.
Five Republicans joined Democrats in
voting against pursuing the lawsuit. No
Democrats voted to move forward with the
suit.
Mr. Boehner, speaking just before the vote,
said Congress needed to assert its authority
under the Constitution to combat executive
overreach. "This isn't about Republicans and
Democrats. It's about defending the

Constitution we swore an oath to uphold,"
he said.
Mr. Obama, speaking to a friendly crowd in
Kansas City ahead of the vote, said that
suing him wasn't a productive thing to do.
"Everybody recognizes this is a political
stunt," he said of the lawsuit. "But it's worse
than that, because every vote they're taking
like that means a vote they're not taking to
actually help you."
The legal and political fallout from the
decision to pursue the lawsuit remains
largely unclear. Many legal experts have
questioned whether the courts would take up
such a suit, suggesting that lawyers
representing the House could face
significant hurdles.
A court could question whether the House
has met the standard of showing that it has
been harmed by the president's actions,
particularly because lawmakers are suing
him for not enforcing a law they have
repeatedly sought to repeal. Another
question is whether the House, in acting
without the Senate, has standing to sue the
White House.
Moreover, said College of William and
Mary law professor Tara Grove, courts have
repeatedly avoided arbitrating political
88

disputes between the
legislative branches.

executive

and

Democrats' campaign arm, said in an
interview.

"We're in uncharted waters, and I think any
judicial court would want to avoid weighing
in," Ms. Grove said. "I'd be very surprised if
the court grants standing."

The Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee has been bringing up the lawsuit,
and asserting that the GOP-led House plans
to impeach Mr. Obama, while asking for
donations. The group raised $1 million on
Monday alone, and a total of $7.6 million
since Mr. Boehner first announced the
lawsuit in late June.

Proponents of a suit have argued there is
precedent for the legislative branch suing the
executive, and that lawmakers can argue that
they have been harmed by the White
House's taking away their constitutional
authority to legislate.
Candidates from both parties are likely to
use the suit as a political touchstone as they
head to their districts this week to campaign
ahead of the midterm elections. Republicans
who have long criticized the White House
and Mr. Obama for executive overreach on
issues such as immigration and the health
law plan to use the suit to show their base
that they are resolved to rein in the
president.
"While there is at least one political branch
willing to enforce the law, we will not fail to
act through whatever means of which we
can successfully avail ourselves," Rep. Bob
Goodlatte (R., Va.), chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, said during floor
debate.
Democrats say the lawsuit helps them make
the argument to voters that Republicans care
more about attacking Mr. Obama than
legislating. "While it was intended to rev up
their base, it has had the unintended
consequence of revving up ours," Rep. Steve
Israel (D., N.Y.), who heads the House

The lawsuit has led to increasingly
contentious exchanges between the White
House and House Republican leaders,
particularly over whether the lawsuit is a
prelude to the House seeking to impeach Mr.
Obama. Mr. Boehner on Tuesday said any
talk of impeachment was a "scam" started
by the White House. "They are trying to
rally their people to give money and show
up in this year's election," Mr. Boehner said.
While Mr. Boehner had said there are no
plans to seek impeachment, some more
conservative lawmakers have suggested it
remains an option.
The House GOP lawsuit isn't the only new
legal challenge facing the Obama
administration. On Tuesday, West Virginia
filed suit against the administration,
challenging its decision to allow insurance
commissioners to choose whether to let
insurers temporarily to continue to sell
policies that don't comply with the
Affordable Care Act.
The suit, filed against the Department of
Health and Human Services in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia,
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argues that the extension allowing state
insurance commissioners to reinstate such
policies placed a burden on the states.
West Virginia Attorney General Patrick
Morrisey said the delay in cancellations
shifted
political
accountability
and

discretion over enforcement of certain
federal laws to the states. "The president
cannot pick and choose which laws to
follow and which to ignore on the basis of
political convenience," Mr. Morrisey said.
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“Constitution Check: Could the House Sue the President for Refusing to
Carry Out the Laws?”
Constitution Daily
Lyle Denniston
June 24, 2014
THE STATEMENTS AT ISSUE:
“Presidents must exercise some discretion in
interpreting laws, must have some latitude in
allocating
finite
resources
to
the
enforcement of laws and must have some
freedom to act in the absence of law.
Obama, however, has perpetrated more than
40 suspensions of laws. Were presidents the
sole judges of the limits of their latitude,
they would effectively have plenary power
to vitiate the separation of powers, the
Founders’ bulwark against despotism.
Congress cannot reverse egregious executive
aggressions such as Obama’s without robust
judicial assistance. … It would be perverse
for the courts to adhere to a doctrine of
congressional standing so strict that it
precludes judicial defense of the separation
of powers.”
– Syndicated columnist George F. Will, in
The Washington Post on June 22, praising
efforts in the House of Representatives to
pass legislation that would allow the House
to sue President Obama with a claim that he
is unconstitutionally refusing to carry out
laws passed by Congress. By “congressional
standing” he meant the right to file a
lawsuit.
“Obama has worked around Congress with
breathtaking audacity… So much for the

separation of powers. In a desperate attempt
to stem the hemorrhaging of legislative
power, members of Congress are turning to
the court to enforce their constitutional
prerogative.”
WE CHECKED THE CONSTITUTION,
AND…
The Constitution has nothing to say about
ways to cure the kind of gridlock that now
exists in the national government in
Washington. There is frustration in the
White House as President Obama finds
himself unable to get much of his legislative
program through Congress, and there is
frustration in Congress – especially in the
Republican-controlled
House
of
Representatives – whenever the President
takes unilateral action to put some of his
policies into effect without legislative
approval.
Neither side seems willing to yield, and the
Constitution – based as it is on the benign
assumption that those in national leadership
will always find ways to govern, more or
less successfully – has no specific provision
to force compromise.
The checks-andbalances written into the division of
government powers can turn out to barriers
to action, especially in circumstances like
those that now prevail in the nation’s capital.
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It is perhaps tempting to think, as the
commentary by columnist George Will
suggests, that this is a problem that ought to
be handed over to the courts: get them
involved to enforce the lines of demarcation
between what Congress does and what
presidents are allowed to do.
However, there is, and has long been, a
constitutional barrier to the courts acting as
an arbiter of inter-branch disputes between
Congress and the White House. Its origin is
in the Constitution’s Article III, and its
meaning comes from the way the courts
have interpreted the limitation spelled out
there. “The judicial power,” it says, “shall
extend to all cases…and controversies.” A
“case or controversy” means, in this context,
a live lawsuit, with those on each side
having something genuinely in dispute, and
that something is capable of being decided
by the use of rules of law.

believe frustrated the will of Congress, they
have been met at the door of the courthouse
with a polite refusal to let them in. Failing to
get their way in the skirmishing with the
White House does not give members of
Congress a right to take their grievance into
court. Frustration does not make a real
lawsuit, according to this notion.
Some lawyers and scholars, however, have
from time to time wondered if this situation
has to continue unchanged. Since the
Constitution also gives to Congress the
authority to define the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, what cases they can and
cannot decide, why couldn’t Congress just
pass a law declaring that one house or some
of the members of Congress do have a right
to sue the President over a legitimate interbranch dispute, in order to protect the
legislative prerogative of that part of the
government? Wouldn’t that work to get such
a lawsuit past the door of the courthouse?

The courts, in short, will not decide mere
abstract legal controversies, and they will
not hand out advisory opinions on how the
laws or the Constitution are to be
interpreted. Courts have a number of ways
of showing respect for those restrictions on
their power, and one of them is to refuse to
decide what is called a “political question.”
In this sense, “political” does not mean a
partisan issue; it means an issue that the
courts find has to be decided, if it is decided
at all, only by the “political” branches:
Congress and the Executive Branch.

It is a plausible argument, and columnist
George Will found it entirely persuasive in
the column quoted above. There is a catch,
though: expanding the jurisdiction of the
courts to hear what are, at their core,
political disputes would still be an attempt to
create a “case or controversy” that satisfied
Article III’s requirements. In other words,
the constitutionality of such an expansion of
court authority would itself be a
constitutional issue that the courts would
have the authority to decide.

Time after time, when members of Congress
have sued in the courts, because the
Executive Branch did something that they

The courts can be jealous guardians of their
notion of what the Constitution allows, or
does not allow, in terms of judicial review.
92

The resistance to resolving political disputes
is quite deeply set. One might suggest that it
would take an inter-branch controversy of
monumental proportions to cause them to

give up that reluctance. Is the feud over
President Obama’s use of his White House
powers of that dimension? That may well be
debatable.
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“The Supreme Court’s Powerful New Consensus”
New York Times
Neal K. Katyal
June 26, 2014
For years, particularly after the 2000
election, talk about the Supreme Court has
centered on its bitter 5-to-4 divisions. Yet it
is worth reflecting on a remarkable
achievement: The Court has agreed
unanimously in more than 66 percent of its
cases this term (and that figure holds even if
Monday’s remaining two cases, on the
Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive
coverage and on public-sector unions, are
not unanimous). The last year this happened
was 1940.
The justices’ ability to cross partisan divides
and find common ground in their bottomline judgment in roughly two-thirds of their
cases — including the two decisions handed
down Thursday, restricting the president’s
ability to issue recess appointments during
brief breaks in the Senate’s work, and
striking down a Massachusetts ban on
protests near abortion clinics — should
remind us that even in this hyperpartisan
age, there is a difference between law and
politics.
Unanimity is important because it signals
that the justices can rise above their
differences and interpret the law without
partisanship. The best illustration of this in
the modern era is Brown v. Board of
Education, in which the court unanimously
declared racial segregation in education to
be unconstitutional. When the justices forge

common ground, it signals to the nation the
deep-seated roots of what the court has said
and contributes to stability in the fabric of
the law.
The court has not always valued consensus
so highly. At the nation’s founding, the
justices each wrote separate opinions —
leaving lawyers, and indeed the nation, to
guess what the court was actually saying as
a whole. It took Chief Justice John
Marshall’s leadership, at the start of the 19th
century, to bring the court together and to
establish the practice of writing a single
opinion for the court. Marshall was not
above using hard and soft persuasion, going
so far as to invite his colleagues to live
together in a Washington boardinghouse,
where they bonded and discussed cases over
Madeira. Disagreement on the court in that
century was rare, with dissents occurring
only roughly 10 percent of the time. Chief
Justice William H. Taft, in the first decades
of the 20th century, reportedly talked his
colleagues out of more than 200 dissenting
votes with his formidable political skills.
But the modern era has been something of a
disaster for unanimity. Chief Justice Earl
Warren was able to achieve unanimity only
36.1 percent of the time; Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger, a scant 35.8 percent. One
of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist’s
final public acts was to express exasperation
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at the fractured court. In 2005, on the final
day of his final term, a frail Rehnquist
described his last majority opinion by first
outlining his views, then the three
concurrences filed, and then the three
dissents filed, and joking, “I didn’t know we
had that many people on our court.”
Compare that talk, and those numbers, to
what Chief Justice John G. Roberts
Jr. achieved this year with his colleagues.
People remember Chief Justice Roberts’s
2005 confirmation hearing for his statement
that his job would be to call balls and
strikes. But something else he said is worth
remembering: that he would try to bring
about “a greater degree of coherence and
consensus in the opinions of the court.” He
pointed to Warren’s leadership in Brown as
an example.
Unanimity, of course, would mean little if it
were reserved only for minor things. But the
court was unanimous this term in cases that
posed big central questions, like whether the
government could search your cellphone
without a warrant, whether software could
be patented, whether the rules for classaction securities lawsuits should change, and
many others. Those cases were not easy
ones. In the cellphone case, the government
made forceful points about the ways in
which those searches were permissible, and
indeed necessary, for law enforcement. The
software industry and its foes argued
vociferously about whether software patents
were destroying the economy or creating it.
And so on. What’s more, the court wasn’t

unanimous because the justices sat on their
hands; to the contrary, they reversed the
lower court 74 percent of the time this year.
Many justices have pointed out the
importance of published dissent. There is no
doubt that dissents can serve a useful role by
explaining when a justice thinks the majority
has gone off the deep end. But unanimity
also sends its own powerful message — one
that might be eclipsed in the headlines by a
sensational dissent, but could ultimately
have a greater impact. Take the abortion
decision on Thursday, which was unanimous
in its bottom line, but not in its reasoning.
Chief Justice Roberts joined four justices
appointed by Democratic presidents — the
same lineup that saved the Affordable Care
Act two years ago, that time for a liberal
result, unlike Thursday’s.
This path, of trying to forge places of
agreement even among people who are
inclined to disagree, is the essence of what
the American experiment is all about. In an
era when the leadership of the House of
Representatives is suing the president, when
people across the aisle cannot even be in the
same room with one another, the modesty
and cultivated collegiality of the nine
members of the Supreme Court this year
remind us all that there is another way.
Instead of worrying about balls and strikes,
Chief Justice Roberts has shifted his efforts
to a new focus: making all nine justices play
ball for the same team. The country, and the
rule of law, are better off for it.
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“With Filibuster Threat Gone, Senate Confirms Two Presidential Nominees”
New York Times
Jeremy W. Peters
December 10, 2013
The Senate slowly began working its way
through a backlog of presidential nominees
on Tuesday now that Republicans are
virtually powerless to block confirmations,
approving a once-stalled judge to a powerful
appeals court and a new director for the
agency that oversees federal home lending.
But Republicans, still seething over a power
play last month by Democrats to curtail the
filibuster significantly, have settled on a
strategy for retribution: Make the
confirmation process as time-consuming and
painful as possible for Democrats.
“There’s a price that has to be paid when
people abuse the rules,” said Senator Orrin
G. Hatch, Republican of Utah. “And let’s
face it. These guys have completely
obliterated the rules.”
And so the tone was set for the final days of
the 2013 Senate session, a period that
promises to be longer on acrimony than on
productivity.
With little actual legislation expected as the
Senate winds down before its Christmas
recess in less than two weeks, Democrats,
who control the action on the floor, have
decided to use their new power to push
through dozens of presidential nominees for
everything from high-profile positions like
the secretary of homeland security to more
obscure ones like ambassador to Albania.

But the two-century-old Senate rule book
still offers the minority party plenty of
avenues to stall even if the filibuster is not
an option. Like a losing team using up all its
timeouts before the end of a game,
Republicans have started to take advantage
of those alternatives and vowed on Tuesday
to continue doing so as long as they could.
“It’s very important that we do what we
think is necessary to bring home the point
that they broke the rules,” said Senator John
McCain, Republican of Arizona. “They have
basically violated everything I’ve known of
as a member of the United States Senate.
For us to say that’s fine, business as usual, is
not something that we could possibly do.”
Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the
Republican leader, said flatly, “If the
majority can’t be expected to follow the
rules, then there aren’t any rules.”
Republicans have employed several tactics
already, including one on Tuesday that
forced the abrupt adjournment of the
confirmation hearing for President Obama’s
choice to lead the Internal Revenue Service,
John A. Koskinen. They also forced the
Senate to burn through all four hours of
mandatory debate time on the nomination of
Representative Melvin Watt, the North
Carolina Democrat picked to head the
Federal Housing Finance Agency. Often
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senators will reach an agreement to yield
that time.
Mr. Watt’s nomination was ultimately
confirmed Tuesday by a vote of 57 to 41.
The nomination of Patricia Ann Millett to
the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit also cleared the
Senate, 56 to 38.
Democrats said they saw Republican efforts
to slow down the confirmation process as an
exercise in venting frustration. “It’s
retaliatory,” said Senator Tom Harkin,
Democrat of Iowa. “It’s revenge,” he added,
noting that Democrats had a way of making
things unpleasant themselves: by forcing
Republicans to be on the Senate floor while
they draw things out.
“They’re going to have to keep speaking for
four hours or eight hours at a time,” Mr.
Harkin said. “And I don’t think they’ll have
the stomach to do that on Fridays and
Saturdays.”

Some Republicans are reluctant to dwell on
nominations too long out of fear that it will
distract from their efforts to focus attention
on the problems with the Affordable Care
Act.
Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, the majority
leader, has vowed to keep the Senate in
session right up until Christmas if he needs
to. But Republicans have shown no signs
that they are bluffing. Many of them are still
in shock that Mr. Reid resorted to the rule
change — so divisive it is known as the
nuclear option — when he used a
parliamentary tactic to alter the filibuster
rules with a simple majority vote.
Ordinarily, Senate rules changes require a
two-thirds majority, or 67 votes.
“I don’t think I’ve ever felt any worse about
the institution as I do today,” said Senator
Lindsey Graham, Republican of South
Carolina, who said Republicans should
make their displeasure as clear as they
could. “I don’t know where this all ends,” he
added.
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“Senate Confirms Obama Nominee Under New Filibuster Rules, World
Doesn’t End”
Huffington Post
Jennifer Bendery
December 10, 2013
Senate Republicans warned Democrats of
the grave consequences of going "nuclear"
with filibuster rules, saying it would destroy
comity and come back to haunt them when
they're in the minority.

President Barack Obama praised the
Senate's action and noted that Millett's vote
passed with some GOP support. Sens. Lisa
Murkowski (R-Alaska) and Susan Collins
(R-Maine) voted for her confirmation.

But Democrats went ahead and changed the
rules anyway, and now we're seeing what a
nuclear explosion looks like in the Senate: a
noncontroversial judge was approved
Tuesday by a majority vote, 56-38.

"I'm pleased that in a bipartisan vote, the
Senate has confirmed Patricia Millett to be a
judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, filling a
vacancy that has been open since 2005,"
Obama said in a statement. "She has served
in the Department of Justice for both
Democratic and Republican Presidents. I'm
confident she will serve with distinction on
the federal bench."

Patricia Millett's confirmation to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit makes
her the first nominee to move forward in a
post-filibuster reform world. Democrats
have plenty of other nominees lined up
behind her now that it only takes 51 votes to
advance executive and judicial nominees
(except for Supreme Court nominees, who
still require 60 votes).
A senior Democratic aide said the Senate
will vote on about a dozen nominees before
adjourning for the year, including some, like
Millett, who Republicans previously
filibustered for reasons that have nothing to
do with their credentials. They include two
other D.C. Circuit nominees, Janet Yellen
for the Federal Reserve and Mel Watt for the
Federal Housing Finance Agency. All are
expected to get confirmed this time around,
many with GOP support.

But just because it's easier for Democrats to
move nominees on the Senate floor doesn't
mean Republicans won't continue holding
them up at other stages of the confirmation
process.
In addition to GOP senators simply not
making recommendations for nominees to
fill court vacancies in their home states, The
Huffington Post has counted at least 13
nominees currently stalled in the Senate
Judiciary Committee because of nine
Republicans (and one Democrat) refusing to
put forward "blue slips," or a tradition in the
committee that allows senators to advance or
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block judicial nominees from their home
state.
Many of the stalled nominees hail from
Arizona, with Sen. Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.)
being the top offender in not submitting blue
slips. Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) is refusing
to submit a blue slip for his own nominee,
William Thomas, who would be the first
openly gay black male federal judge if
confirmed. Sen. Richard Burr (R-N.C.) is
withholding a blue slip for another key
nominee, Jennifer May-Parker, who would
fill the longest standing district court
vacancy in the country.
Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), the committee
chairman, seems content to keep the blue
slip rule in place for now.
"I assume no one will abuse the blue slip
process like some have abused the use of the
filibuster to block judicial nominees on the
floor of the Senate,” Leahy said in a

statement after the Senate changed its
filibuster rules. “As long as the blue slip
process is not being abused by home-state
senators, then I will see no reason to change
that tradition.”
But Michelle Schwartz of Alliance for
Justice, a left-leaning association of more
than 100 organizations focused on the
federal judiciary, said GOP senators are
already misusing the blue slip rule and her
group is prepared to pressure Democrats to
nix the tradition if things get any worse.
"We have seen Republicans withhold blue
slips from qualified nominees and there is
serious concern that they will only intensify
that practice now that another means of
obstruction has been foreclosed," Schwartz
said. "If Republicans abuse the blue slip
courtesy as they abused the filibuster, then
we will ask the Senate to reform that process
as well."
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